Archive for the ‘Business Model’ Category

Bankrupt Macro Ideology

Friday, May 22nd, 2009

There were some very key changes while we slept on the global stage:

 

1.        The UK “AAA” debt outlook was downgraded from stable to negative. 

2.       The Dollar and more important the U.S. ability to finance 15% negative debt to GDP (now < $13.3 trillion GDP projected for 2009 against a growing deficit) is looking more and more risky.

3.       The Canadian SWF’s (Sovereign Wealth Funds) / pensions are also apparently limiting ther buying of Sovereign “paper” from heavily indebted countries (e.g., USA).

4.       The U.S. debt auctions continue to be anemic to poor placing reoccurring pressure on the Fed to purchase its sister agency debt (now estimated to be in excess of 1.5 trillion). 

5.       The growth models that propelled the world markets for the last 25 years are done – the U.S. consumer made Asia and the Middle East SWF’s rich and flowing in trade surpluses and dollars.  The 4th version of global trade has reached its end.

 

I could go on but the potential implications are becoming clear (not facts, not yet):

 

1.       The ability of private industry to finance debt in the second half of this year may come under significant pressure – aka higher costs to borrow if it is available at all.

2.       If Sovereign debt and the ratings of EU developed nations continue to fall, so will the fragile bottoming we are seeing.  Who will buy debt backed by “hope?”

3.       The result might be new corporate costs cutting initiatives across the board regardless of industry. Question is how are they measured and are they enough? 

4.       Anyone recording profits in dollars will experience profit and currency conversion pressures.

5.       M&A’s will be “survival” driven (i.e., little if any premiums), while the credit freeze for medium to small institutions already struggling for funding will drive may to close.

6.       The lack of analytical discipline and rigor will lead many to make uninformed decisions and experience “unintended” consequences

7.       We could be in for a “third” shockwave starting in Q3 2009.

8.       Those dependent on high volume U.S. markets (e.g., outsourcers, manufacturing, B2C, …) will have to radically change their arbitrage business model and strategy or watch others take over their position of dominance.

9.       If unemployment passes 12% (forget the 10% upper control limit), then government intervention may reach a disequilibrium – for globally interconnected economies at these levels we do not have any models or experience with this circumstance (this is beyond the localization of the Great Depression).

10.   Whilst economists want governments and consumers to “spend money” they don’t have there is only so much reality within this tattered dogma. 

 

Much more could be said…if there is such a thing as an “offensive defense” then this should be the approach for many leaders.  Non-conventional revenue growth may be a key to future success.

After near Industry Extinction, Analytics are Questioning Everything

Monday, May 18th, 2009

Accelerating Returns of Mortgage Operations Utilizing Multi-Faceted Indicators and Analytics

By Mark P. Dangelo

 www.Innovative-Relevance.com

For decades, managers and their teams have sought the “holy grail” of decisive and discrete performance indicators that would assess and predict corporate profitability.  As we now know, their inability to cohesively link strategy, operations, risks, and rewards have resulted in permanent industry realignments – M&A’s, failures, oversight, fiduciary breeches, and consumer alienation.  However, the industry’s past predicaments were not just contained within individual products or exotic solutions, but with the downstream implications of their adoption.  Straightforwardly stated, analytical causality across the enterprise was grotesquely misinterpreted.

Additionally, complacency and arcane systems of beliefs led many to rely on irrelevant indicators, practices, processes, and technologies.  Even after billions were spent on SOX, Basel and other regulatory compliance efforts, the recent economic crisis clearly indicates that the global public, not just domestic ones are no better protected than they were in the “Age of Enron.” 

So, with all the theories, vendors, and prior pundits being replaced, we have to ask, “What is next?”  What are the informational governance and regulatory approaches that have efficacy today and tomorrow?  How can agile and adaptable analytics be achieved across the breath of our partners and data sources, including our servicers linked to the programs targeting consumer “workouts?” 

Whereas, proactive business analytics and governance were once the domains of larger lenders and originators, innovative business and technology advances have leveled the playing field regardless of organizational size and budgets.  The questions are many – the answers are evolving.  However, let’s take a “walk on the wild side,” and see what our future holds beyond the anti-climatic stress tests.

Conducting a Diagnostic Assessment

For many organizations, a holistic and critical examination of analytical usage (i.e., business intelligence, dashboards and scorecards, analytical applications, MDM, warehouses, et al) is a time consuming process tainted with internal biases and prejudices.  Often times, analytical evaluation and projections are done across the enterprise using fragmented ROI point-solutions — not the least of which are ignoring the hundreds of siloed “management” spreadsheets lacking little referential integrity or understanding of how they interconnect or influence each other. 

The result of the ensuing analytical chaos are diverse “versions” of operational performance, ROI, risks, regulatory compliance, and worse yet, a false sense of security – until as illustrated recently, the bottom falls out of markets.  Moreover and with great frequency, organizations latch onto “analytical answers” and quickly proceed with allocating resources all in a desperate effort to secure success. 

Yet, is the most convenient analytical answer correct?  As many enterprises discovered during the recent global financial and economic meltdown, it wasn’t the answers that were difficult to achieve — it was the fact that the wrong questions were being asked.  Without the relevant questions and proper alignment with required strategy, managers were ill-prepared to deal with pervasive calamities.  It was as one industry observer said, “Driving with your eyes closed.”

It is this hidden cost of disjointed analytical architectures, spread among the business units and IT, which led AMR in 2008 to estimate that global enterprise expenditures exceeded $57 billion USD.  What is more, according to December 2008 Accenture report[i], only 60% of organizational decisions were supported by analytical insights.  The rest of those tens of billions of dollars worth of corporate investments, well, were not. 

With an average organizational analytical investment consuming between $250,000 and $1 million, depending upon market sub-segment, decision makers have to be wondering, what all this technology was really worth — as budgets are cut, consumer scrimp, and the two year recession lingers into 2010.  This begs the question for many decision makers, “What are the 3-year returns and operating costs for analytical investments in 2010-2012?  Can we afford to sustain what we have and invest in the future?  For every dollar of capital spent, are we looking at another$ 5 to $7 spread over the next 3 years?”

To gain a handle on the use of enterprise analytics (EA) and the “questioning of everything” previously deployed within the entity, organizations have begun conducting independent diagnostic assessments to establish an objective baseline and an iterative roadmap for the future.  Organizations are no longer just examining impacts within lines of businesses, but the forward and backward value chains spanning multiple operational segments.  Representative diagnostic categories include:

·         Financial Impact / Financial Integrity

·         Monitoring Methods, Rigor, Techniques

·         Operational and Business Intelligence

·         Visualization, Views, and Meta Data

·         Technology and Infrastructure

·         Performance Management, Reporting

·         Data Warehouses / Marts

·         Security, Privacy, Information Governance

·         Dashboards and Scorecards

·         Regulatory Compliance and Delivery

Underpinning a base of solid financial and performance data, organizations have embarked on their own “analytical stress tests” in an effort to define what and how to frame their indicators – and the methods and sources needed for their accurate delivery.  Even though we hate to admit it, the regulators just may have been on to something.  When examining the data, process, and indicators contained within the stress tests themselves, before the results were subject to change, there are substantial self correcting and regulating diagnostic guidance buried in their approaches. 

In a Financial Times article by Russell Walker on January 30, 2009, he stated, “JPMorgan’s success came from identifying novel data and realizing that it challenged conventional thinking.  Isn’t that really what analytics and the investments they represent are all about?

Integrating Strategy, Demands, and Success

Analytics taken out of context can yield “false positives” – aka erroneous decisions.  Without proactive linkages to strategy, operational demands, and performance results, analytics are merely bits and bytes spinning on a metallic coated platter.  By making the most of the entire spectrum of corporate analytics and their implications, what led to an industry’s dishonor can be used as its foundation for future growth.

For executives seeking to move forward and identify profitable new markets, what strategies for growth should be defined, deployed, and sustained in the prospective face of onerous government oversight?  What has worked in the past and where should organizations concentrate their resources in the future facing new consumer behaviors?  Finally, how can technology and policy be exploited to create a robust business case for reducing costs, growing profits, and capitalizing on market trends, especially within the rebirthed secondary markets?

Many quantitative organizational analytical approaches are starting over.  After huge CAPEX investments coupled with significant budget increases, the value of insight and governance produced by “intelligence and analytical” tools have yielded a false sense of purpose and security. 

The long held ideas, practices, and techniques of assessing and projecting have proven inadequate for current operating demands.  With historical 20/20 hindsight, what is now apparent is that the conceptual and piecemeal methods deployed were too remedial and the business solutions too abstract.  A new way forward must be developed.

Using the aforementioned diagnostic assessment, progressive organizations are integrating strategy, demands and success into an iterative go-forward roadmap (illustrative list below):

·         Consumer profiles, market usage, and competitor capabilities

·         Orchestrated solution sets built on componentization of best-in-class

·         Advanced multi-dimensional data segments (e.g., OLAP)

·         Predefined and configured software components

·         Forward and reverse “supply chains” across micro and macro sources

·         Auditability, repeatability, adaptability to promote consistency and accuracy

·         Interoperability of decisioning networks and toolsets

·         Vendor capability and product leadership within centers of excellence

·         Reusable libraries of statistical data sources and routines (e.g., ETL, marts, warehouses)

·         Visual and standardized query capabilities and reporting across functional segments (e.g., financial, operations, risks)

 

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While there is much more that needs to be written on internalization of agile and adaptable analytics (AAA) into the corporate culture of tomorrow’s finance and mortgage groups (FMG’s), the journey begins with an objective assessment and a new path forward.  For as we now realize, all too painfully, there are “ticking time bombs” still remaining within our existing operations.  They must be rooted out.

The uses of analytics were once about “personal” manipulation and insights – individual, department, or special operational interest.  The survival criteria of organizations are now focused on their end-to-end usage across the enterprise, while proactively integrating isolated components among the channels to achieve relevant macro-micro efficacy. 

A new age of Enterprise Analytics has been launched as it is now questioning everything surrounding past and future indicators.  However, are we ready to embrace new questions and non-conventional insights?  Or will we relegate the new findings to aberrations that are just too painful to accept?

 



[i] “Business Intelligence Software Time is Now,” BusinessWeek, Rachael King, March 2, 2009.

A Toxic Solution

Monday, March 9th, 2009

Using Crisis Innovation, Strategy and Technology for Tomorrow’s Challenges

By Mark P. Dangelo

www.Innovative-Relevance.com

J.P. Morgan once stated, “No problem can be solved until it is reduced to some simple form.  The changing of a vague difficulty into a specific, concrete form is a very essential element in thinking.  As he also noted and practiced, sustainable change rarely happens during periods of economic comfort. 

So as markets, investors, politicians, and homeowners seek answers in a “simple form,” those practitioners within the discipline of crisis innovation are challenging, “Are we really asking the right questions for tomorrow’s problems in the face of trillions at risk?”  As others have noted since J.P. Morgan’s time, just because the answer is simple does not mean it addresses the core issues.

Whereas innovation within the business markets has become a cliché, crisis innovation deals with non-traditional approaches implicitly demanded during times of great stress and uncertainty.  Simply put, they question organizational “truths.”  As you can imagine, their positions, strategies, and expert opinions have not been popular – until recently.  The markets have ensured that crisis innovation is no longer esoteric or academic. 

Along these lines, during times of prosperity crisis innovators and their approaches appear detached from reality.  In business terms, they are “outdistancing” their markets and buyers.  Their “radical,” complex approaches now are being reexamined under the growing weight of huge, multi-year industry and individual failures. 

In an effort to stitch together new, innovative strategies, I asked retired Colonel John Warden, acclaimed master planner of Desert Storm and now CEO of Venturist, his insights on financial markets, risks, success, and strategy.  “There are many factors which contribute to the real success or failure of any political, military, business, or personal enterprise.  If the strategy is not good enough, the intelligence of the participants, the brilliance of the tools or weapons employed, and the prowess of execution will be to no avail for it is strategy that integrates all three to enable success.  Without strategy, an organization is dependent on luck or genius–both of which are statistically unlikely and utterly undependable to be available when needed.”

As we will discuss later in this article, 21st Century crisis innovators are looking beyond archaic limitations today – in particular, innovators are seeking new methods to repurpose toxic assets, while creating a new securitization paradigm.  But first, perhaps crisis innovators’ unorthodox questions make more sense during times of calamity?  Foundationally, do organizations have the crisis leadership skills and insights necessary to deal with a 100-year event?

A Legacy of Distress

Where we often hear about the dire state of the domestic economy, the housing crisis, and the consumer sentiments, let’s set a holistic baseline on why this legacy of distress has provided a mandate for crisis innovators and the strategic and tactical solution sets that must be implemented. 

Since the early 1990’s innovation for much of the financial and mortgage markets has been about gaining efficiencies.  Striving for lower costs and greater throughput, the value chain of players (i.e., originators, servicers, aggregators, outsourcers, investors, and Wall Street firms) concentrated on lending, registration, standards, and fraud prevention actions.  The process chains were a one-way pipeline that served the market needs during times of unprecedented euphoria and easy credit.  Some argue that was financial innovation.  Others believe that efficiency gains were merely incremental process improvement.  Still more now believe it was an “innovative” recipe for failure and crime.

This legacy debate aside, the industry for years was concentrated on delivering solutions primarily around a common question or theme, “how can we improve the volume of lending to consumers to gain greater market breadth, wallet share, and profits?”  In July 2007, just before the MBS / CMBS markets catastrophically fractured, a boasting of these “innovative” ideals were echoed by former CitiGroup CEO Chuck Prince – “we’re still dancing.”  20 months later, a U.S. Federal government injection of a trillion dollars, $2 trillion yet to be recognized and written down, loan programs and collateral exceeding $3 trillion, and a global wealth loss exceeding $40 trillion, those “innovative” financial products now resemble a terminal cancer. 

Moreover, private securitization has virtually halted, the GSE’s are under conservatorship and demanding billions to stay afloat, 10 million homes are at risk of delinquency, millions more are in trouble, and hundreds of thousands are in active foreclosure.  Consumer debt now exceeds $13 trillion or roughly the equivalent of the national U.S. GDP – a situation that last occurred during the Great Depression.  Now let’s add insult to injury.  Additional data from the government projects that if unemployment reaches 8% by mid 2009 coupled with declining home valuations, up to 35% of all homeowner’s may possess negative home equity (aka “upside down” loans).  As of now, the national federal loan rescue plan looks like only a down payment on a broad and sustained rebalancing.

If there was a time for crisis innovation and new innovative leadership, the time would be now.  So what can be done?  What approaches should be undertaken?  Are there any strategies or technology solutions that provide better efficacy as we rebuild a financial structure and stability from the ashes?

“To achieve system change, it is necessary to change a number of centers of gravity as operations against just one or two will rarely be effective,” states John Warden.  “Contrary to popular wisdom, time is always the enemy of enterprise.  It may take a long time to accomplish something but the longer the time from inception to completion, the lower the probability of success.  For a high probability of success, parallel, time-compressed operations against multiple system centers of gravity are a necessity.  As operations move from parallel to serial, the probabilities of success falls rapidly while the cost of operations mounts dramatically.” 

Hitting the Reset Button

“One might ask, ‘How can highly paid business and government leaders with blue-chip business degrees create such a mess,’” said Michael Brooks, President of Checkmate Advisors and acclaimed business analytics and causality expert.  “The more important question is, ‘Can we trust that they have what it takes to create the mess that they’ve made?’”

Crisis innovators and their pragmatic methods look beyond historical limitations and thought processes.  Nearly 100 years ago J.P. Morgan said it best, “I don’t want a lawyer to tell me what I cannot do. I hire him to tell how to do what I want to do.  In fact, as in most cases today, taking the serious legal drawbacks away from potential discussions there are historic paradigm leaps that may be achieved. 

We all know there are trillions in “toxic assets” still hidden in the balance sheets of many, many financial and non-financial institutions.  We also know that these assets are not only thinly traded, but often lack robust documentation.  Representing an “out-of-the-box” idea, a 21st century crisis innovator was seeking a new solution to the burgeoning toxic debt hangover enveloping global markets.  Arguably “hitting the reset button” for crisis innovation sometimes leads to reassembling the best of ideas, organizations, and individuals in new and unique ways. 

Ignoring “conventional” wisdom and domestic industry editors who ridiculed European debt instruments, he proposed a solution set using July 2008 Treasury and FDIC sanctioned debt into a value framework for the repurposing of existing assets.  The end solutions, trustees, and governance structures weren’t common practice, but that didn’t mean it couldn’t gain robust domestic support in the future.

Thinking further, the 21st century innovator began aligning the multitude of needs and values of the non-for-profits, thinly traded or illiquid MBS markets, lenders, servicers, and investors.  He openly proposed combining old non-performing tranches with modified and new loans, thereby properly assessing the risks, while instituting a “cover pool” for future non-performance.  Bottom line, he proposed using the best value from each process participant and creating an acknowledged set of new asset classes that is higher rated (as compared to the old ones) and potentially has implicit government downside guarantees. 

Taxpayers (aka Treasury and the Fed) would provide downside support in a similar fashion already developed for several banks.  Private investors would benefit from upside and counterparty risk transparency along with instrument security.  Lenders would be able to reinstate these assets into performing tiers, thereby freeing funds and paying back the government.  Technologist and vendors would provide the “glue,” analytics, and dashboards needed for delivery.  Securitization markets would again be more than GSE based.  Private money would prime the pump of investment – controlled investment.

Like J.P. Morgan, this 21st Century crisis manager sought the simpler solution from those options that were already available.  He thought, unlike many existing managers, “Since the rules of engagement no longer apply, why can’t I reassemble the best of the legacy pieces into something new?”  He further mused, “If the government, associations, and lenders are seeking changes, why not address market, public, and regulatory heartburn with a positive twist on a known approach that already accounts for $3 trillion in worldwide debt?”

The above example is currently just that – an idea that has yet to gain acceptance as it runs counter to existing dogma and standing regulations.  However, with vast changes are already in play, why not use a crisis innovation to achieve a new positive reality?  If the worlds’ governments are rewriting the rules in an effort to remake the financial markets, why can’t a “simpler” solution be part of the reset efforts?

Mr. Warden concludes his belief on why crisis innovation is important during period of survival and great upheaval.  “Every strategic endeavor will either fail in some manner, or less likely, succeed.  In either case, survival and prosperity demand exiting the current strategy.  In the case of success, it means moving on to a new endeavor that is appropriate for the next time increment whereas in the more likely event of failure, it means abandoning a strategy that is not working while there are still resources available to try something else.  In many ways, end games and exiting are the most difficult parts of strategy; people don’t like to change and they don’t like to admit error so their tendency is to stick with something long past the point where doing so makes any sense at all.” 

* * * * * * * * *

For those who know my strategy and work, my ideals cannot be confused with those who represent the current “establishments.”  My approaches seldom reflect conventional thinking or shackles of the “ordained” pundits.  Unlike many within and around the industry, I hope I have demonstrated that crisis innovators don’t get their cues from talk radio shows or the limitations within struggling vendors and enterprises.  You see, it is not singularly about principles, it is about sustainable survival.  The slogans, analogies, methods, and the dogma that were promoted are dead or dying.  We, collectively as a series of interrelated disciplines and experts, need to make sure that we are not part of the decay littering the landscape. 

It should be clearly understood for strategy, process, and technology that crisis innovation is very uncomfortable for established organizations secure in “the way it has always been done.”  However, survival and prosperity no longer reside in the minds and actions of a privilege few.  The dawn of the crisis innovator is upon the worldwide economies and underpinned technology infrastructures.  How will you innovate, and who, by name, are your crisis innovators within and outside of your organization?