By Mark P. Dangelo
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/tools/FullStory.aspx?ArticleId=30420#full
For the last five years, the idea of any form of private
securitization has been met with scorn by bankers and investors. Whereas, there are many historical reasons to
accept the dogma that securitization outside explicit government guarantees are
too risky, this misconception continues to haunt and drag on the much
anticipated bottoming and recovery process of the housing market. With an additional 1 to 1.5 million
foreclosed homes coming to market within the next 12 months, more than any
other year since 2009, the availability of non-portfolio capital for conforming
and jumbo loans will be critical to emptying the housing hangover bucket. Even with record low rates, the markets are still
a hollow shell of their former glory.
How precisely should capital be added to the financial
housing supply chain? To guarantee any
sustainable and meaningful housing recovery, after declining 75% from its peak,
the infusion of private money with knowledgeable investors must be the cure and
not the 5% . As Congress finally finds its
post-election year nerve to tackle the final disposition of the over $150
billion conservatorship of the GSE’s, it is time to examine the explicit linkages
that made housing finance work and fail, while preparing new, transparent
investment supply chains which are adaptable for future markets and homeowners.
The “originate and forget” models are long dead—long live
the “originate and invest” models! Funny
thing, while everyone is concentrating on why the prior models failed and even
now who to blame, very few are gaining sufficient traction to project the
impacts and needs outside of localized market analysis and the availability of
credit to disadvantaged borrowers. Yet,
without a proper framing of the macro markets and investment opportunities,
including secondary offerings and trading, a design for a local market may
serve as the catalyst to a new series of funding debacles analogous to those
taking place in the EU member countries.
Indeed, real estate and housing is local, but investing is now solidly global.
Crafting and Defining the Strategies
Historically, the linkages between housing and housing
finance were waterfall in nature—with home lending falling into the buckets of
securitizations or MBS’s positioned neatly downstream from the originating loan. Enabled by monetary and fiscal policies,
market rates and risk perceptions propelled banking portfolios’ of home assets
to decline from around 50% in the mid-1990’s to near zero by 2006. Six years later, the GSE’s who as the crisis
hit, had a market share of around 40% of securitizations in 2007, they now
dominate over 90% of the secondary markets and debt instruments nearly all of
which is guaranteed. The price tag to
date has been great and the taxpayer risks continue to pile on as the
government uses them to facilitate workouts and buybacks.
Moving forward, as stated in last month’s article “Break
Government Addiction—or Risk Falling Behind in Global Markets”, any sustainable
housing recovery must be majority underpinned by private money and not
public. With the right margins, rates,
and innovation it is possible to attain capital increases in markets by up to
50% over current levels. Yet, to properly
align the origination to investment supply chain, there are five critical questions
that must be answered.
·
What is the origination strategy that provides
the greatest return, while accepting valuable and frequently fluid homeowner stratifications?
·
What investment strategies are working? Which investment strategies are underfunded
or unanswered—by originators (and backend servicing) and their lending
strategies?
·
Where do the strategies perform best and in what
types of markets consistent with today’s economic outlooks and lingering
housing afflictions (e.g., foreclosures and availability of credit)?
·
What pipeline or conduit outlets work for the
banking business model selected? How
many outlets and what types should an institution pursue beyond the channels
dominated by explicit government guarantees?
·
What standards and guidelines will be acceptable
to ensure that risks and returns are explicitly managed and adjusted?
When the answers to the above questions are known, solutions
to significant process questions must be established and implemented including:
·
Are the handoffs and flows between
compartmentalized origination, servicing, and funding actions clearly
understood, adaptable and auditable over time periods?
·
Are the risk management, underwriting,
governance and investor reporting clearly defined and delineated across red
line boundaries—how can information and data be seamlessly leveraged for
accuracy and efficiency?
·
How are the demands of the investor and
secondary markets met with securities or bonds backed by lending assets (e.g.,
MBS’s and covered bonds)? What processes
exist to manage information discovery and dispersion on a real time basis when
compared to the old standards of months?
·
Outside of agency selling, what processes across
the financial supply chain have been updated to accommodate new loan types,
lending parameters, consumer credit, and vast data now assembled in preparation
for private markets and secondary trading?
·
With regulations such as Dodd-Frank and Basel
III now consuming the vast majority of available discretionary budgets and
organizational time, where will the expertise and staffing come from to address
the underlying technology solutions needed to adhere to 100% conformance?
With the business operations framed and the process
questions addressed, organizations must now concentrate their expertise on the
serious technology demands necessary for implementation, auditing, monitoring,
and continuous improvements.
·
What front, middle and back-office processes require
automation to ensure adequate returns and operational efficiencies? If they exist, what gap changes have been
identified?
·
Where can solutions be implemented to promote
greater market share and margins in addition to basic cost controls?
·
How can data capture and storage demanded by
regulatory compliance be leveraged from existing sources, while guaranteeing
accuracy, retention, and disposal across the financial supply chains?
·
Where can technology aid with risk management
and asset pooling to promote healthy securities and bonds including the use of
asset swaps to satisfy covenants (e.g., covered pools)?
·
What partners or providers can augment the
needed skill set changes occurring rapidly across the fixed-income market at a
time when staffs are shrinking and expertise retiring?
·
What innovations will be required to reconstruct
or develop solutions? Where will they
come from and how will they be adapted to ensure conformity across legacy
platforms and point-based solutions?
When taken altogether, the practice of throwing of teams of people
at the strategy solution is not the answer—at least not the only one. As already briefly framed people, costs, CAPEX,
lost opportunity, pipeline volumes and margins, technology, data, regulations,
and reduction in lending are all material components across the financial
supply chains.
The Importance of Creating the Originate and Invest Models
It has been 15 years since a forward looking, comprehensive
view of the financial supply chain has been undertaken outside of localized
markets (e.g., a county in FLA).
Holistically, the view and analysis is complex and opaque as researchers
are more inclined to address issues close to home. However, with changing regulations, the ideas
of selling portfolioed assets to the investment and ratings community now brings
greater scrutiny and demands to represent and warrant bundles as performing.
The process linkages underpinned by technology demands
continues to evade most enterprises, especially those without the larger CAPEX
budgets bringing increased market and reputation risks to those trying to keep
up or diversify. Moreover, the
procedures needed to promote efficiency across the lending and investment chains
are designed for a market that is government dominated rather than for private
money, governance, insurance, and reporting.
The rise of properties coming to market will create a void
of capital needed for national and local investment due to over 1 million
foreclosures that will put pressure on prices while decreasing the available
pool of applicants as capital gets harder to come by and government programs
stall in an election cycle. Looking
forward, new asset classes and fixed income instruments have not been
considered when pricing loans or for secondary selling of loan types when
spread over a $1 trillion market.
For forward thinking technology and process professionals,
understanding the trends and strategies of how this huge, future-framed, and domestically
important market operates with its systemic deficiencies, will allow firms to
set up investment products, services and bundled offerings which are integrated
and meaningful to Global Street buyers of debt—not just to their internal
departments or divisions.
In summary, critical, interconnected and frequently
dependent components needed to ensure robust, private secondary markets for
securities and bonds include:
·
Volume and frequency
·
Programs and eligibility
·
Rates and yields (including prepayment and
reinvestment risks)
·
Bundling and segmenting
·
Underwriting
·
Selling and representations
·
Hedging and swaps
·
Risk-return tradeoffs
·
Governance and reporting
·
Standardization of contracts across conforming
and non-conforming
·
Consistency and correlation of loan types
·
New or emerging fixed income instruments
While the above list is not comprehensive, it serves as a
guide for the chicken-and-egg originate and invest models—lenders want to lend
and mitigate risks by selling securities, investors want risk-attributed
products, and the money of fixed income and secondary sales go back into the
lending community to make more credit available. For some of us, the 1997-2006 mindset of
“throwing loans over a fence” for investor and secondary markets never really
worked—and it has proven 100% far from wise.
When the organizations finally accept the tight couplings
between strategies and models from the originating and investment worlds,
viable, long-term solutions can be reached and the crisis will finally turn the
corner. With the disposition of the
GSE’s now beginning in earnest, the time is now to begin to plan out and accept
the markets without 100% government buying, securitization, and
guarantees.
Bottom line, until origination strategies align beyond
government sponsorship and into private investor community demands and
expectations, the housing markets will languish. Until the questions are asked and answered,
the U.S. housing market will be a government controlled and dictated one driven
by excessive regulations and arcane, political demands. Until we prepare for a new housing future of
origination to invest with new fixed-income instruments and operational
linkages, the markets will always be a shadow of their former glory.
We know the questions.
Are we prepared for the answers?